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Abstract: 
A growing framework of legal and ethical requirements limit scientific and commercial evalua-
tion of personal data. Typically, pseudonymization, encryption, or methods of distributed com-
puting try to protect individual privacy. However, computational infrastructures still depend on 
human system administrators. This introduces severe security risks and has strong impact on 
privacy: system administrators have unlimited access to the computers that they manage in-
cluding encryption keys and pseudonymization-tables. Distributed computing and data obfusca-
tion technologies reduce but do not eliminate the risk of privacy leakage by administrators. 
They produce higher implementation effort and possible data quality degradation. This paper 
proposes the Trusted Server as an alternative approach that provides a sealed and inaccessible 
computational environment in a cryptographically strict sense. During operation or by direct 
physical access to storage media, data stored and processed inside the Trusted Server can by no 
means be read, manipulated or leaked, other than by brute-force. Thus, secure and privacy-
compliant data processing or evaluation of plain person-related data becomes possible even 
from multiple sources, which want their data kept mutually secret.  
1. Introduction: 
1.1 Background 
 Both scientific and commercial statistical evaluation of data in the fields of epidemiology, phar-
macology, education or economics use person-related data containing highly sensitive private 
information. This comprises person-identifying data (also called person-related data like name, 
address, date of birth etc.), which privacy protection rules do address, as well as person-
relatable information, which allow identifying a person by using re-identification techniques [1]. 
Legislation [2] and ethical conventions [3] impose strict privacy protection rules not only regard-
ing person-related but also person-relatable information. While data evaluation may be permit-
ted by law or consent for a certain purpose [4], it has to be ensured that any other usage of pri-
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vacy-related data is effectively prevented. Other areas with growing interest in privacy protec-
tion are social networks [5] or highly security relevant networks e.g. for military use [6]. 
1.2 The problem 
 Privacy protection in computational environments requests to protect data and computational 
processes from unauthorized human access. Current computational environments allow access 
control, data-storage and -transport protection by user-authentication and user-rights man-
agement, as well as disk- and transport-encryption. Additionally, pseudonymization permits 
evaluation of privacy-protected data that are readable for humans. However, none of those 
methods provides protection against access, infringing pseudonymization, manipulation and 
theft by an administrator with root-rights on involved servers. The core problem of privacy pro-
tection and data security is the need for a system administrator with unlimited rights to manage 
computers. 
1.3 Existing solutions 
 Current solutions to this security and privacy core risk make use of data processing diversifica-
tion over multiple computational instances and obfuscation techniques: 
1.3.1   Double Coding Pseudonymization 
 A data source provides pseudonymized data, e.g. patients' clinical data with the identifying val-
ues replaced by pseudonyms. A trusted third party exchanges the 1st level pseudonyms with 
new 2nd level pseudonyms and forwards the medical data with the 2nd level pseudonyms to the 
evaluating institution. The matching between 1st and 2nd level pseudonyms is kept secret at a 
trusted third party so no direct depseudonymization can be done by members of the data 
source and evaluating institutions neither accidentally or willingly [7]. 
1.3.2   Differential Privacy 
 Adding non-destructive randomness to real data as well as random data that look like real data 
obfuscates datasets. Ideally, this process – optionally combined with pseudonymization - hin-
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ders or eliminates the identification of the person behind these data but does not affect the sta-
tistical evaluations on certain variables [8,9]. 
1.3.3   Secure Multiparty Computation 
 This method uses encrypted data exchange and complex multi-stage algorithms allowing multi-
ple parties to commonly evaluate a function over their respective private data without giving 
the other parties access to these private data. [10] 
1.3.4   DataShield 
 Instead of aggregating data in one place where evaluations are performed, the underlying calcu-
lations are being sent to the data owners for in-place evaluation. Only results are returned and 
aggregated for further processing so no confidential private data ever leave the data owner's in-
frastructure. [11] 
1.4 Common disadvantages 
a) All methods described in section 1.3 protect data more or less against access from system 
administrators but share the weakness of increased effort for planning, implementation, infra-
structure, administration and operation. Their complexity outgrows, as more parties will get in-
volved. 
b) Any kind of data-alteration by pseudonymization or obfuscation affects data quality. The de-
gree of possible data degradation can be approximately quantified by applying these methods to 
publically available data and compare them to a direct naïve evaluation. 
c) Without obfuscation there is the risk of privacy leakage even from pseudonymized data with 
person-relatable information.  
1.5 A different approach 
 The human factor creates disadvantages related to the methods described in section 1.3. There-
fore, a generic, widely adaptable computational environment that works without any human 
system intervention or possible access to internal data provides the needed solution. We call 
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such an environment the Trusted Server (TS) and define its requirements for a practical imple-
mentation as follows: 
1.5.1   Standards compliance 
 Hard- and software-components are commonly available and do not require low level customi-
zation or modification out of the ordinary. 
1.5.2   Familiar operation 
 Setup, operation and usage is similar and comparably complex to administrating a conventional 
server with the same configuration. 
1.5.3   Full transparency 
 The solution is fully transparent and does not work with secrets or obfuscation. 
1.5.4   Unlimited verifiability 
 Users can review all components and the fully working system in any depth desired. 
1.5.5   System inaccessibility 
 There is no system access neither during runtime nor after production. 
1.5.6   Secure communication 
 The TS allows controlled submission of data and commands as well as controlled response. 
1.5.7   Persistent encryption 
 The TS uses irrevocably encrypted storage which protects against external access by anyone at 
any time. 
1.5.8   System verification 
 It is possible to verify the production system state is unaltered. 
1.5.9   Backup strategy 
 It is possible to backup and restore a basic TS installation in a comfortable way. 
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1.6 Possible advantages of a Trusted Server 
a) Data stored and processed inside TS do not need additional data- or privacy protection. Data 
securely uploaded to TS after sealing, does not need to be pseudonymized, obfuscated or en-
crypted. 
b) This provides the unique possibility to store and evaluate unaltered plain person-related data 
even from different and mutually non-trusting sources in one single computational stage. 
c) Working on plain unaltered data grants the highest information quality possible excluding any 
data degradation and impact on results deriving from obfuscation or pseudonymization. 
d) There is no technical and administrative overhead caused by involving multiple parties, pseu-
donymization and obfuscation. 
1.7 Implications 
 Any data uploaded to the TS after sealing by design are inevitably lost if the TS needs a new set-
up and have to be uploaded again. Depending on the data-amount this may cause serious delay 
requiring alternative concepts for securely delivering large data. 
1.8 A working solution 
 Running sample applications of real world scenarios are provided on a reference implementa-
tion of the proposed TS. The TS is not just a new concept but an available stable production 
platform for previously impossible privacy protected data evaluation on plain unaltered person-
al data.  
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Meeting the requirements 
a) The use of exclusively freely available hardware and Free Open Source Software (FOSS) grants 
standards compliance, familiarity, transparency and verifiability. Our first implementation uses 
Debian GNU/Linux as operating system in a default installation with Linux Unified Key Setup 
(LUKS) and Logical Volume Manager (LVM) disk encryption. Other unixoid FOSS operating sys-
tems may qualify as well. 
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b) Simple shell scripts running at startup realize system inaccessibility. They remove all system 
user accounts, block root login, remove ssh completely, and set firewall and hosts access control 
to block all but https network traffic.  
c) Secure communication is possible over secure and encrypted https with optional system in-
dependent user authentication. 
d) Persistent encryption is the core method. Based on LUKS disk encryption a two stage sealing 
mechanism is established. 
e) Any party concerned prior to sealing can inspect disk images of the readily prepared TS sys-
tem. Further verification of the TS features follows from inspecting comprehensive logs and 
checksums after sealing. They prove the server's unaltered state. 
f) The system disk images allow restoring the system in a fast and convenient way. 
2.2 LUKS based system sealing and verification 
 During initial operating system setup, LUKS (together with LVM) enables disk encryption. LVM is 
secondary to understand disk encryption and the sealing process. Therefore, we omit a thor-
ough discussion of its role. During the installation of a new Linux system with full encryption, 
the system disk splits into two data partitions: partition1 one for the static boot files and parti-
tion2 for the encrypted operating system, as well as other software, and user data. In fact, there 
is an additional 'partition' respectively logical volume for memory-swapping as well as possible 
additional volumes for user data or whatever. Since those logical volumes are located within the 
encrypted partition2 we simply discuss the boot and encrypted partition in the following:  
a) After dividing the disk into two partitions, the LUKS header is written to partition2. The LUKS 
header consists of 8 key-slots. Each of them can store a copy of the master-key which is encrypt-
ed with a keyphrase. The keyphrase may be manually entered or automatically read from a 
keyfile [12]. We store the keyfile within the unencrypted boot-partition1. The master-key is used 
to encrypt the data area of partition2, but itself is never persistently stored anywhere (see Fig 
1). 
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Fig 1 Initial layout of the LUKS encrypted disk 
b) During the boot process, the initrd with the core operating system contents is loaded from 
the unencrypted partition1 and control moves to LUKS. Usually, a user submits now a keyphrase. 
Instead, the TS system reads the key-file from the unencrypted partition1 and compares it with 
the matching keyslot-entry in the LUKS header. With the verified passphrase it decrypts the en-
crypted master-key and stores it in Random Access Memory (RAM). Since data in RAM are vola-
tile on power loss, one has to redo the decryption procedure during every system boot (see Fig 
2). 
Fig 2 The master-key is decrypted using the passphrase and stored in volatile memory 
c) The processor transparently reads and writes from and to partition2 using the master-key as 
long as the master-key resides in RAM. Data on partition2 will always be encrypted; decrypted 
data only exist in volatile memory (see Fig 3). 
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Fig 3 Operational system state with transparent data de- and encryption 
d) The sealing process starts immediately upon booting a production ready TS and erases the 
LUKS keyslot as well as the encrypted master-key. The master-key still resides in volatile memory 
and the system remains operative but the keyfile containing the keyphrase is meaningless since 
neither a keyslot nor an encrypted version of the master-key exists (see Fig 4). 
Fig 4 Sealed operational state 
e) The master key vanishes from volatile memory If the system is rebooted or power is down 
(either willingly or e.g. upon theft of the server or disk). The key file still exists on the unen-
crypted partition1 but without the corresponding LUKS keyslot containing the encrypted master-
key. The only way to decrypt partition2 is by brute force (see Fig 5). 
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Fig 5 Inaccessible disk state after reboot or power down 
f) As described up to now, the sealing process prevents effectively any access to the system and 
storage by third parties. But, it does not yet solve the basic problem. An administrator might 
have a backup of the LUKS header and restore it to regain disk access. The following trick over-
comes this problem: We establish a two stage setup consisting of a physical server, a virtual ma-
chine hosted on it, and two LUKS-encrypted physical disks. 
g) The physical server boots from disk1 and performs the sealing. After sealing, it reencrypts the 
second disk using the keyfile stored in that disk's partition1. LUKS reencryption creates a new 
master-key that is stored encrypted with the given keyfile. While the system administrator 
knows that keyfile he does not know the newly generated master-key. It cannot be revealed 
from the already sealed physical host server either. 
h) Finally the physical server starts the virtual machine which boots from disk2 and performs the 
self-sealing process (see Fig 6) too. 
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Fig 6 The complete Trusted Server with dual stage sealing 
2.3 Applications and customization 
a) The system administrator implements an apache2 web server configured for https traffic that 
provisions the sealing logs and system verification data. If required apache2 also enables secure 
data input and output as well as system independent user authentication.  
b) Depending on the TS's further configuration and initialization procedures, ssh access is con-
figured and secured. 
c) The TS virtual machine also provides additional services and operative user applications that 
are needed.  
d) Following good practice for configuring a server, IPtables firewall and host access control re-
duce access and allowed network traffic to the required minimums. 
2.4 System verification 
a) When the TS is installed, full disk images of the physical host and the virtual machine are 
stored in a safe place.  
b) Anyone can fully inspect these disk images to validate the TS installation and state. 
c) Each step of the sealing process is logged. The log-files provide comprehensive status infor-
mation on the host and the virtual machine disk of the sealed TS: 
 The system writes SHA-512 hashes from all files on the disks and to the sealing log. 
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 It lists essential configuration files in the sealing log. 
 It archives configuration folders in compressed format. 
d) The system publishes sealing log, system logs, and the compressed configuration archives to 
the (optionally access restricted) Trusted Server's website. Thus, anyone can compare the sealed 
state with the content of the previously disk images disclosed for verification. 
2.5 Backup and restore 
 The disk images created from the host and virtual machine disks can also be used for fast re-
store of the Trusted Server's pre-sealing state in case of a configuration change or system 
maintenance. 
2.6 Initializing production state 
 Simple bash-scripts perform the sealing process (section 2.2) automatically on a fully installed 
and purposely configured Trusted Server.  
2.7 Initialization scripts reference 
 The following batch-scripts specify our Trusted Server implementation. They can be easily modi-
fied and customized. Their linear stepwise structure intends to provide easy readability of the 
sealing log. 
2.7.1   Initialization scripts executed on TS-Host 
init_trusted_mode.sh (manually executed by administrator) 
set –x 
## INIT TRUSTED MODE TS-HOST 
## ACTIVATE SEALING AFTER REBOOT AND WRITE OUTPUT TO LOGFILE 
echo '/root/init_trusted_mode_reboot.sh > /root/0_init_trusted_mode_host.log 2>&1' 
>> /root/cron-reboot.sh 
## -- REMOVE ONLY LOGON USER -- 
userdel -f trust 
##REMOVE ALLOWED HOST  ACCESS PERMISSION AND VERIFY 
rm /etc/hosts.allow 
cat /etc/hosts.allow 
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cat /etc/hosts.deny 
reboot 
 
cron-reboot.sh (automatically triggered from /etc/crontab: @reboot) 
#!/bin/bash 
## cron-reboot TS-Host 
mount /dev/sdb1 /mnt 
iptables-restore /root/iptables.v4 
ip6tables-restore /root/iptables.v6 
## INIT TRUSTED MODE AND CREATE HOST SEALING: 
/root/init_trusted_mode_reboot.sh > /root/0_init_trusted_mode_host.log 2>&1 
 
init_trusted_mode._reboot.sh (called from cron-reboot.sh) 
set –x 
## INIT TRUSTED MODE TS-HOST 
reboot 
## SWITCH IPTABLES OUTGOING POLICY TO DROP AND DELETE SSH PERMISSION 
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP 
## [set line number accordingly:] 
iptables -D INPUT 4 
## LIST IPTABLES 
iptables-save 
iptables -L –n 
ip6tables-save 
ip6tables -L –n 
cat /etc/hosts.allow 
cat /etc/hosts.deny 
## REMOVE SSH SERVER 
apt-get -y purge openssh-server 
apt-get -y autoremove 
systemctl status sshd 
## REMOVE ONLY LOGON USER - CREATES ERROR IF ALREADY CORRECTLY REMOVED  
userdel -f trust 
cat /etc/passwd 
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cat /etc/shadow 
## REMOVE DISK ENCRYPTION KEY -- 
cryptsetup luksErase /dev/sda2 
cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda2 
## PRINT OLD VM KEY INFORMATION 
cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb2 
## AND REENCRYPT TS-VM DISK 
cryptsetup-reencrypt -v -d /mnt/keyfile -l 512 /dev/sdb2 
## PRINT NEW VM DISK KEY INFORMATION 
cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb2 
## CREATE ARCHIVES OF ETC AND ROOT FOR PUBLISHING 
zip -r /mnt/etc-host.zip  /etc 
zip -r /mnt/root-host.zip  /root 
## LIST FILES AND SHA3 CHECKSUMS 
ls -RlA / 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /boot 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /etc 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /home 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lib 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lib64 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lost+found 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /media 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /mnt 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /opt 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /root 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /sbin 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /srv 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /tmp 
## since /usr/bin has X11 -> . recursive link: 
rhash    --sha3-512 /usr/bin/* 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/games 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/include 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/lib 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/local 
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rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/sbin 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/share 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/src 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /var 
## COPY LOG TO TS-VM BOOT PARTITION 
cp /root/0_init_trusted_mode_host.log /mnt 
## UNMOUNT TS-VM BOOT PARTITION 
umount /mnt 
## START TS-VM 
virsh start debian9 
2.7.2   Initialization script executed on TS-VM 
cron-reboot.sh (automatically triggered from /etc/crontab: @reboot) 
#!/bin/bash 
# cron-reboot TS-VM 
iptables-restore  /home/trust/iptables.v4 
ip6tables-restore /home/trust/iptables.v6 
## INIT TRUSTED MODE AND CREATE VM SEALING LOG 
/home/trust/init_trusted_mode.sh > /var/www/log/1_init_trusted_mode.log 2>&1 
 
init_trusted_mode.sh (called from cron-reboot.sh) 
set –x 
## REMOVE HOST ACCESS PERMISSION AND VERIFY 
rm /etc/hosts.allow 
## SWITCH IPTABLES OUTGOING POLICY TO DROP AND DELETE SSH PERMISSION 
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP 
## [set line number accordingly:] 
iptables -D INPUT 5 
## LIST IPTABLES AND HOST ACCESS 
iptables-save 
iptables -L –n 
ip6tables-save 
ip6tables -L –n 
cat /etc/hosts.allow 
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cat /etc/hosts.deny 
## REMOVE SSH SERVER 
apt-get -y purge openssh-server 
apt-get -y autoremove 
systemctl status sshd 
## REMOVE ONLY LOGON USER 
userdel -f trust 
cat /etc/passwd 
cat /etc/group 
cat /etc/shadow 
## REMOVE DISK ENCRYPTION KEY 
cryptsetup luksErase /dev/vda2 
cryptsetup luksDump /dev/vda2 
## MOVE HOST LOG AND ZIP TO WEBROOT 
mv /boot/0_init_trusted_mode_host.log /var/www/log 
mv /boot/etc-host.zip /var/www/log 
mv /boot/root-host.zip /var/www/log 
chown www-data:www-data /var/www 
## CREATE ARCHIVES OF /ETC AND /HOME/TRUST FOR PUBLISHING 
zip -r /var/www/log/etc-vm.zip   /etc 
zip -r /var/www/log/trust-vm.zip /home/trust 
## CREATE LDAP LOG 
date >> /var/www/log/ldap.txt && slapcat -n 0 >> /var/www/log/ldap.txt && slapcat -n 
1 >> /var/www/log/ldap.txt 
## SET PERMISSIONS TO APACHE2 
chown -R www-data:www-data /var/www 
## LIST FILES AND SHA3 CHECKSUMS 
ls -RlA / 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /boot 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /etc 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /home 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lib 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lib64 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /lost+found 
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rhash -r --sha3-512 /media 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /mnt 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /opt 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /root 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /sbin 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /srv 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /tmp 
## since /usr/bin has X11 -> . recursive link: 
rhash    --sha3-512 /usr/bin/* 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/games 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/include 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/lib 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/local 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/sbin 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/share 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /usr/src 
rhash -r --sha3-512 /var 
## ENABLE APACHE WEBSERVER 
systemctl start apache2 
## SEND MAIL 
echo $(date) >> /home/trust/date.txt 
mail -s "trusted server running@138.245.80.17" bomhard@ibe.med.uni-muenchen.de <  
home/trust/date.txt 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Comparisons of the proposed methods 
a) Table 1summarizes qualitative differences between the Trusted Server's generic approach 
and other common and well-established strategies to privacy-protected personal data evalua-
tions We focus on server- and implementation-related but task-independent criteria: Adminis-
trative Skills, Overhead, Complexity, Adaptability, and Data Quality. It shows the Trusted Server’s 
superiority regarding ease of implementation and usage, flexibility and negative impact on re-
sults. 
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Table 1. Trusted Server versus established methods 
 Trusted Server Double Coding 
Pseudonymization 
Differential Privacy Secure Multiparty 
Computation 
DataShield 
Administra-
tive Skills 
moderate: any 
average system 
administrator is 
able to follow the 
instructions 
medium: special-
ized knowledge 
about pseudony-
mization software 
is required  
high: nondestruc-
tive data obfusca-
tion requires 
special skills and 
good planning 
very high: deep 
knowledge in 
cryptography and 
mathematics is 
necessary 
medium: specialized 
knowledge about 
DataShield software 
and setup is re-
quired 
Overhead very low: one 
sufficiently perfor-
mant server for 
data provisioning 
and evaluation is 
all needed even by 
multiple parties  
medium: data 
provisioning and 
evaluation must be 
separated in inde-
pendent infrastruc-
tures plus a third 
party is required 
moderate: the data 
provider must 
obfuscate data and 
evaluation has to 
be separated in an 
independent 
infrastructure 
very high: all 
participants have 
to implement a 
complex and 
highly resource 
consuming com-
putation infra-
structure 
high: all participants 
have to implement 
a complete software 
and hardware 
infrastructure 
Complexity very low: standard 
GNU/Linux operat-
ing system and 
tools and some 
simple shell scripts 
is all needed 
moderate: pseu-
donymization 
software is inte-
grated in an oth-
erwise convention-
al processing chain 
high: data obfusca-
tion algorithms 
have to be custom-
ized for every type 
of use case 
very high: the data 
processing chain 
has to be designed 
and tailored for 
every distinct use 
case 
medium: distributed 
data processing 
requires careful 
data normalization 
and customized 
aggregation 
Adaptability very high: almost 
any technology and 
solution available 
for GNU/Linux can 
be used with low to 
zero customization 
high: since pseu-
donymization does 
not affect data 
structures required 
process customiza-
tion is moderate 
medium: possibility 
and quality of data 
obfuscation de-
pends on data 
types and evalua-
tion purposes  
very low: imple-
menting the 
processing and 
encryption chain is 
singular for every 
use case 
high: evaluation are 
performed on 
normalized but 
otherwise original 
data with standard 
R programs  
Data Quality maximum: exclu-
sive usage of plain 
and unaltered data 
grants zero influ-
ence on results 
high: in most cases 
pseudonymization 
will not, but might 
affect evaluation 
results 
medium: obfusca-
tion reduces data 
quality, but that 
may be irrelevant 
to evaluations 
very high: since 
data are encrypt-
ed, but unaltered, 
zero degradation 
can be achieved 
high: normalization 
and aggregation 
after processing 
likely will not, but 
could affect results 
b) Table 2 provides scenario-independent quantitative information on the additional effort for 
data and privacy protection caused by a Trusted Server. Comparison is made to a conventional 
server operating without any data protection based on typical server-lifecycle parameters (Basic 
installation, Customization, Initialization and Sealing, Backup and Restore, System updates) and  
practical usability (System stability, Performance degradation, and Resource consumption). 
Table 2. Additional effort for data and privacy protection using a Trusted Server 
Issue Comment Additional effort 
Basic installation Two servers, host and virtual machine, have to be installed, LUKS-disk encryp-
tion needs to be set up and sealing scripts have to be installed. 
about factor 3 
Customization Task-specific software installation and configuration is required on the virtual 
machine only and in a conventional fashion. 
none 
Initialization and 
Sealing 
Depends on installation size, disk- and system performance. Values relate to a 
fully functional standard Debian GNU/Linux system on two different hardware 
platforms. 
25 minutes on older 
2CPU/8GB/SATA Laptop 
15 minutes on 
12CPU/32GB/SAS Server 
Backup & Restore Duration depends on disk and interface performance and installation size. 
Any data uploaded after sealing at least decryption keys have to be uploaded 
again after sealing. 
+ second disk restore 
+ sealing 
+ data or key upload 
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System update Full restore and sealing is needed, update times itself are equal to unsecured 
server but have to be applied to host and virtual machine. 
+ restore 
+ double updates 
+ sealing 
System stability No instability or otherwise different behavior compared to our conventional 
servers was observed during one year of operation on several servers. 
none 
Performance 
degradation 
Possible impact on performance by LUKS disk encryption or the virtual machine 
is not observable on any modern hardware. 
not observable 
Resource con-
sumption 
Moderately better equipment is required. + second disk 
+ 4 GB RAM for host 
c) The Trusted Server provides a new state-of-the-art regarding security and protection. Table 3 
gives an overview on typical operation-related security threats like leakage of foreign data or se-
curity corruption and general threats like theft, hacking and data transfer. The most relevant (but 
only slightly elevated) risk for the TS relates to data transfer.  
Table 3. Systematic risks for privacy and data security in different methods 
Threat 
Trusted Server Double Coding 
Pseudonymiza-
tion 
Differential Privacy Secure Multiparty 
Computation 
DataShield 
Leakage of 
foreign data 
by personnel 
not possible and 
easily verifiable 
possible if the 
trusted third party 
and evaluation 
party work togeth-
er or if the trusted 
third party has 
access to personal 
data 
not relevant since 
nobody has access 
to foreign plain 
data 
depending on 
implementation 
very unlikely if 
possible at all, but 
difficult to verify 
not relevant since 
nobody has access 
to foreign plain 
data 
Security 
corruption by 
personnel 
very difficult since 
the sealed and 
frozen system state 
report is disclosed 
for in depth verifi-
cation 
possible at the 
trusted third party 
possible by leakage 
or manipulation of 
obfuscation algo-
rithms 
depending on 
implementation 
very unlikely, but 
difficult to verify 
possible at all data 
providers' servers 
Theft of disk 
or server 
full encrypted disk 
without LUKS 
header can only be 
decrypted by brute 
force attack against 
the master key 
if disks are full encrypted disk they can only be decrypted by brute force attack against 
the master key or passphrase 
Hacking slightly higher 
protection than a 
properly secured 
GNU/Linux server 
(no user logon) 
the single servers can be protected on state-of-the-art level, but every additional compu-
tation and communication stage and especially added software is a potential security 
risk and may introduce new vulnerabilities 
Man-In-The-
Middle-
Attacks on 
data transfer 
slightly higher risk 
since plain personal 
data could be 
accessible 
slightly lower risk 
since no plain but 
still person relata-
ble data are trans-
ferred 
lower risk since 
transferred data 
are hardly person 
relatable 
low risk since only 
encrypted data is 
transferred 
low risk since only 
analysis commands 
and non-disclosing 
summaries are 
transferred 
3.2 Implementation scenarios 
3.2.1   Privacy-protected User authentication 
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 Basic user authentication can be implemented using apache2's file based user- and password 
database. After TS sealing, no change to those files is possible except by permitting security-
weakening file upload. 
 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [13] replication offers a more transparent and flex-
ible directory service for storing and authenticating user credentials. Apache2 can authenticate 
against any LDAP server instead of using its own user and password database. The free and 
open source OpenLDAP [14] reference implementation permits uni- or bidirectional synchroni-
zation of the LDAP database. The Trusted Server and one or more external primary servers work 
with OpenLDAP. This allows secure credential updates to a sealed Trusted Server. External non-
trusted primary OpenLDAP server(s) store all user credentials. The Trusted Server's OpenLDAP 
instance triggers unidirectional LDAP replication from the external primary OpenLDAP server(s). 
The system initially and regularly during operation publishes full LDAP database-dumps on the 
Trusted Server website. This ensures full control that OpenLDAP contains only credible users.  
 Thus a Trusted Server can be used with changing access permissions to the provided services 
without need for a new setup and sealing. While it is possible to control, that only entitled users 
can access a Trusted Server's web-based service, there is no control if a certain user really ac-
cesses and uses the web-service allowing for access-restricted yet anonymous online services. 
3.2.2   Large data storage 
 Only after the sealing process, person-related plain data must be uploaded to the trusted serv-
er's storage. As consequence, every change or system crash requests a new data upload. To 
avoid long processing times for large datasets (for example when analyzing full human ge-
nomes), encrypted disks attached to the Trusted Server before sealing carry the sensitive data. 
After sealing, the data provider uploads the decryption key to the Trusted Server. The disk can 
be newly mounted in a short time. 
3.2.3   Intentional emergency 'backdoor' 
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 Specific scenarios request maximum data and privacy protection as well as an opportunity for 
secure controlled system access. Sending an encrypted copy of the master-key created during 
virtual machine disk reencryption to a trusted instance allows for secure controlled system ac-
cess. Splitting the encrypted master-key into several parts enhances security and control when 
it's parts are sent to different third parties. Only the active cooperation of all parties allows sys-
tem decryption.  
3.2.4   Automated restore 
 Many professional servers provide watchdog background programs. They monitor the proper 
operation of the server automatically. Thus, server malfunction or unresponsiveness trigger a 
forced cold-reset on hardware level. The server reboots and, if configured for boot over net-
work on disk-boot failure, automatically restores the disk images and starts the initialization 
scripts. 
3.3 Usage examples 
3.3.1   Privacy protected Domain Name Server 
 Server providing Domain Name Services (DNS) store and provide matching internet domain 
names and corresponding internet protocol (IP) network addresses. Whenever a user submits an 
internet domain name to the internet browser, a request is sent to a DNS server to provide the 
IP address of the corresponding server. The DNS server gets and may store the requesting users 
IP address and requested domain, which can be privacy sensitive information. A Trusted Server 
set up as an intermediate so-called DNS proxy server redirects requests to a public DNS server, 
providing its own network address together with the requested domain name and forwarding 
the returned network address to the original requesting client. Person-related clients' IP ad-
dresses are not submitted to the public DNS server. 
3.3.2   Yao's millionaires' problem 
 In 1982 Andrew C. Yao introduced the Millionaires' Problem to theoretical informatics: "Two 
millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not want to find out inadvertently any 
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additional information about each other’s wealth. How can they carry out such a conversation?" 
[15]. Yao's solution relies on complex multiparty algorithms and is one of the initial formulations 
of secure multiparty computation. The Trusted Server permits implementing an extremely sim-
ple solution: It uploads data over a SSL-encrypted web form containing two fields, one for the 
name and one for the value of assets along with a submission button. On every input, the TS 
adds the name-value pair to a table in human readable form, perfectly protected by its privacy 
design. A script sorts the table by value and publishes only the names to a text file on the Trust-
ed Server’s website. 
 Thus, the TS not only transforms one of the challenges of theoretical informatics to common-
level information technology but also provides a highly generic solution. The approach also 
works for large numbers of submissions without significant increase in resource consumption. It 
can be used either open-to-the-public or, using LDAP replication, for a closed access-controlled 
user group. 
3.3.3   Anonymous webmail server 
 A simple transport encrypted web application with a text submission form runs on the Trusted 
Server. The text submission may be open to the public, or OpenLDAP authentication controls 
access. A nickname, comment and optionally a return email-address may be provided. Upon 
submission the content of the form is sent to a preconfigured email address. This can be used to 
provide a secure portal e.g. for whistleblowers or anonymous patients' reports in clinical stud-
ies. Combined with LDAP authentication input may be restricted to a limited user group, while 
retaining full anonymity at least, if the submission form is used from a public non person-related 
computer e.g. in an internet cafe. 
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3.4 Use case: A standard problem in epidemiological research 
 The example simulates the following situation: 
 Data collected in three centers provide the input to a prognostic model. There is a high interest 
in the model but reluctance to share the data openly. The data may contain sensitive infor-
mation on patient mix, treatment strategies, and respective outcomes. The TS provides an ele-
gant solution to this problem. 
 Utilizing R-package plumber [16] with a problem-specific R-script allows to restrict the user to 
the predefined R-function calls when performing the analysis and providing the results. That as-
sures non-disclosure of information, that should not be shared openly. 
 For demonstration purposes and reproducibility we take the openly available dataset GBSG 
from the R-package mfp [17]. The dataset consists of 686 patients and we split it into three con-
secutive parts of about 228 patients representing the data of three different clinics. The analysis 
studies the influence of age (age) and the expression of progesterone receptor (PRM).  
 The TS provides the results of the analysis in a list which consists of the regression coefficients 
c1 for the fractional polynomials of age (f1) and c2 for the fractional polynomials of prm (f2) as 
well as the modified cumulative baseline hazards function (CBH). Both information allow to cal-
culate group specific survival curves:  S(t|age,prm) =exp{-CBH(t)*exp*c1∙f1(age)+c2∙f2(prm)+. 
 The standard CBH is a step function with jumps at each event time.Publishing the CBH in this 
form may allow to reidentify individual patients by observed event times. Therefore we use a 
smoothed form of the CBH which blurs observed event times. This deidentifying step is given in 
the code line www<-lowess(haz,f=0.1). This is a very practical approach that needs more think-
ing in a real scenario. 
 In the following we two R-scripts. The first R-script (plumber.R) starts the plumber server, which 
is remotely accessed over the apache2 proxy. 
plumber.R 
library(plumber) 
r <- plumb("<…..demo.R>") 
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r$run(port=8000) 
 
 The second script (demo.R) contains the analysis which mainly rely on three functions. The func-
tion getPacman attaches the library which manages the specific library attachments needed for 
the analysis. The function readDat concatenates the individual csv data files in the working di-
rectory to a common data object in R. The line with the hash mark before the evalrfc function is 
a decorator which can be interpreted by plumber defining the call the server should respond to. 
The function evalrfc provides the specific analysis data steps, returning the data that are re-
sponded, when the interface is called. After defining the functions, the script performs the fol-
lowing steps: attaching pacman, attaching the specific libraries over pacman and reading the da-
ta. 
 The evaluation is started and results are provided by calling the URL: 
"https://<ipAddressOrDomainName>:<port>/evalrfc" 
demo.R 
getPacman <- function() 
     { 
        if (!"pacman" %in% installed.packages()) 
        install.packages("pacman") 
        library(pacman) 
     } 
readDat <- function(dir) 
     { 
        setwd(dir) 
        all_files <- list.files() 
        dats <- lapply(all_files, read.csv) 
        dat <- do.call(rbind, dats) 
        return(dat) 
     } 
#* @get /evalrfc 
evalrfc <- function() 
     { 
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        result <- mfp(Surv(rfst, cens) ~ fp(age, df = 2, select = 0.05) + fp(prm, df 
= 4, select = 0.05), family = cox, data = dat) 
        coef <- summary(result)$coefficient 
        haz <- basehaz(result) 
        www<-lowess(haz,f=0.1) 
        res <- list(coef=coef,basehaz=www) 
        return(res) 
     } 
getPacman() 
p_load(mfp) 
dat <- readDat("path to data") 
 
3.5 Security considerations 
3.5.1   Decryption resistance 
 Any grade of privacy protection and security is relative. This of course is also valid for the TS. Its 
grade of protection depends on the quality and irrevocability of the Virtual Machine disk2 en-
cryption. LUKS is cryptographically strong [18] and without the key-slot keys it is impossible to 
decrypt the disk except by brute force - that is finding the decryption key by trial and error [19]. 
Successful brute-force attacks against strong encryption are limited to a few intelligence agen-
cies in the world, if possible at all. This in most scenarios is meaningless, since those agencies 
will have access to the protected data anyway. 
3.5.2   Technical limitations 
a) Server BIOS and the CPU-Microcode are closed source and potentially contain undocumented 
functions and backdoors. This implies that today's real-world computing hardware cannot 
achieve absolute trust-to-the-last. 
b) The cryptographic strength of encryption techniques for Solid-State-Disks (SSD) is currently 
under discussion [20]. Exploiting proprietary wear leveling technology to obtain and restore a 
LUKS header with deleted passphrases under rare circumstances might be possible for special-
ists. Therefore, SSD must not be used in a Trusted Server if maximum protection even from high-
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ly skilled attackers is mission-critical. Using SSD with additional hardware encryption may solve 
the problem. This approach still needs validation. 
3.5.3   Tamper-resistance 
 After testing and approval, the system administrators activate the initialization scripts. At that 
point the administrators could change binaries or add scripts in the physical host or Virtual Ma-
chine. This intervention could break security, for example by sending out the secret key and 
LUKS-header created during Virtual Machine disk reencryption.  
 Thorough review of the published logs and comparison of the TS' state after installation and its 
state after sealing are crucial. The SHA-3 hashes and log files published on the TS's website al-
low to detect changes and to reveal most manipulations.  
 For maximum trust, transparency and control, disk images should be crated immediately before 
the sealing is initialized and securely provided to the concerned parties. Ideally representatives 
of all parties personally attend the sealing and receive their disk images. Video self-surveillance 
of the TS and sealing process may be disclosed over the TS website, too. 
3.5.4   Vulnerabilities  
 Aside from added security by sealing, a Trusted Server shares all vulnerabilities and contact sur-
faces with a conventional server having an identical setup. Therefore, we recommend additional 
security measures:  
a) Remove Gnome Virtual File System and any other auto-mounters for external storage to pre-
vent code injection from scripts running automatically when an external USB storage or CD/DVD 
is inserted and external ports are needed for some reason. 
b) Specific scenarios recommend to use means like hardening, creating custom kernels, to use 
SELinux or AppArmour. Applications installed on the Trusted Server need a careful internal secu-
rity check, too. 
c) Disclosing a full disk image for review allows corrupting the SSL transport encryption by a 
man-in-the-middle attack [21], since the private SSL key is disclosed. SSL encryption itself is not 
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affected, as the session encryption keys are created independently from the identifying SSL key. 
However the identity of the Trusted Server needs approval by additional means. 
d) A Cold-Boot [22], DMA [23] or removable media attack on the Trusted Server is possible ei-
ther. Therefore, securing the server physically is a prerequisite e.g. by gluing or soldering in 
RAM-modules and physically removing or destroying CD disk drives and external ports like USB. 
These measures are the same as needed just to secure a conventional server with disk encryp-
tion in a given setting. 
e) Additional protection and security is achieved by using a server-vault or strongroom with 
strict access management. 
f) A physical self-destruction mechanism triggered by any human access to the server-vault may 
protect the TS even against the strongest attackers. 
4. Conclusion 
 The TS overcomes human-centric paradigms in privacy protection concepts. All current ap-
proaches base on either trust or mistrust in single or multiple real persons. Accordingly, they es-
tablish either a network of trust, which spreads information over multiple semi-trusted instanc-
es of human-driven institutions or use complex computation schemes of fully encrypted data so 
nobody needs to trust anyone but himself or herself. Compared to standard non-privacy-
protected solutions both approaches require highly customized workflows.  
 The TS may request moderately prolonged downtimes for maintenance and changes. Compared 
to multi stage approaches this compensates by quick and easy setup as well as minimized work-
flow customization. 
 The TS provides a conventional computational environment that grants Privacy by Design inde-
pendently from any individual. Since the TS behaves - despite self-sealing and irrevocable en-
cryption - like any standard GNU/Linux based system, it is possible to run well-established com-
putational solutions with the highest degree of privacy. 
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